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How the profile gets built

Nobody sells "your data." They just all share it with each other.

That's not a loophole in the language — it's the actual mechanism. No single company hands over a file labeled with your name. Instead, everyday services feed identifiers and behavior into a shared layer that reassembles them into the same thing a sale would produce.

The short version
The flow

From four everyday services to one file on you

TL;DR "We don't sell your data" is true on paper and meaningless in practice.

A simplified version of a real pipeline. Company names are illustrative of the category — the exact partners change, the pattern doesn't.

Retail & commerce

Purchase history, wishlist and browse behavior, delivery address, voice-assistant queries.

Social & messaging

Who you interact with, what you linger on, precise location from photos and check-ins, contacts you've uploaded.

Search, maps & OS-level

Every query, every place searched or visited, app usage across your phone, ad ID tied to the device itself.

↓ Shared out as "audience segments," hashed-email matches, and ad-exchange bid data — legally, under partner and "legitimate interest" terms, without ever being labeled a sale of your data

Data broker & ad-tech aggregation layer

Matches the same person across sources using shared identifiers — a hashed email, an advertising ID, a device fingerprint — even though no single source knew the whole picture. This is where "shadow profiles" get built on people who never used the originating service at all.

↓ Recombined into a single addressable profile

The composite profile of you

Health conditions inferred from purchases and searches, financial tier, likely political leaning, daily routine, household composition and relationships — none of it explicitly stated by you anywhere, all of it derivable from the combination.

↓ Licensed onward, by category

Advertisers

Bid on the right to show you something in real time, milliseconds after you load a page.

Insurers & employers

Feed the profile into risk scoring and screening — with no obligation to tell you it happened.

Government agencies

Can simply buy access to the same profile instead of getting a warrant for the same information.

Why "they don't sell your data" is technically true and functionally meaningless: a direct sale of a named file would be easy to regulate and easy to catch. Licensing anonymized-but-re-identifiable segments, running joint ad auctions, and matching hashed identifiers across "partners" produces the identical outcome — a stranger, three steps removed, ends up with a detailed picture of you — without any single transaction that looks like "selling your data" on paper.
This is exactly the gap Section 10 and Section 12 of the amendment are written to close — see Part III of the full text. Until that exists, the toolkit covers what you can do about it today, including making the profile itself less reliable.
Now that you've seen the shape of it

Two ways to respond: opt out of feeding it, or feed it garbage.

The toolkit's later sections cover both — removing yourself from the pipeline, and introducing noise into the profile that's already been built.

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